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Abstract
Off-the-shelf (OTS) components are increasingly used
in application areas with stringent dependability
requirements. Component wrapping is a well known
structuring technique used in many areas. We propose a
general approach to developing protective wrappers that
assist in integrating OTS items with a focus on the overall
system dependability. The wrappers are viewed as
redundant software used to detect errors or suspicious
activity and to execute appropriate recovery when
possible; wrapper development is considered as a part of
system integration activities. Wrappers are to be
rigorously specified and executed at run time as a means
of protecting OTS items against faults in the rest of the
system, and the system against the OTS itemÕs faults.
Possible symptoms of erroneous behaviour to be detected
by a protective wrappe, and possible actions to be
undertaken in response are listed and discussed. The
information required for wrapper development is
provided by traceability analysis. Possible approaches to
implementing ÒprotectorsÓ in the standard current
component technologies are briefly outlined.
Keywords: system integration, COTS, dependability,
error detection and recovery, wrapping, traceability
1 Introduction
In this paper our focus is on developing new
techniques for improving the dependability of a system
built out of pre-existing items. Use of off-the-shelf (OTS)
software promises reduced development cost but raises
some difficult problems. There is a tendency to use OTS
components in an increasing number of application areas,
many of which have stringent dependability requirements.
The main problems in employing OTS items in such areas
are that they are not reliable enough (or, there is not
enough evidence to support any reasonable claims on
their reliability), they do not have complete or correct
specification, and very often they are not used in exactly
the context they are intended for. New techniques should
be developed that allow designers to systematically
integrate OTS items into systems without damaging their
dependability or, if possible, improving it.
We use the term ÒOTSÓ as a generalisation of the
more common ÒCOTSÓ (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) to
refer to any code that is not developed specifically for a
new system. This includes legacy code, "non development
units", pre-existing software from the same company,
GOTS (Government Off-The-Shelf), commercial and
non-commercial (e.g. freeware or open-source) software.
Wrapping of OTS items is a promising approach to
dealing with many problems in employing OTS software.
We propose to introduce wrappers as a means for
improving the overall system dependability by protecting
system components against each otherÕs faults. We use
the word ÒprotectorsÓ to designate this category of
wrappers. A number of general techniques have been
developed to achieve high dependability by employing
redundant software: N-version programming, recovery
blocks, self-checking pairs, etc. [4]. We view wrappers as
redundant custom-built software to be developed during
system integration. Within this approach the pair
consisting of an OTS item and its wrapper (protector) is
treated as a special fault-tolerant architecture bearing
similarities with several of the general architectures. We
believe that developing protective wrapper is a complex
engineering process that needs general solutions.
Assessing the suitability of OTS items against high
dependability requirements raises concerns about the
availability and suitability of evidence. Techniques for
structuring and analysing safety-related arguments have
been developed [7] which employ information models
and arguments of traceability to deal with the evidence
required and generated during a projectÕs life. These
techniques have also been extended to address the issue of
Òsafe useÓ of OTS items [2]. In our approach, traceability
techniques are used to assist in developing protective
wrappers.
2 The Basic Architecture
Component wrapping is a well known structuring
technique that has been used in several areas. A wrapper
is a specialised component inserted between a component
and its environment to deal with the flows of control and
data going to and/or from the wrapped component. The
need for wrapping arises from the fact that it is impossible
or expensive to change the components to re-use them as
parts of a new system, or it is easier to add new features
by incorporating them into wrappers. Wrapping is a
structured and a cost-effective solution to many problems
in component-based system development. Wrappers are
usually employed for improving non-functional properties
of the components such as adding caching and buffering,
dealing with mismatches or simplifying the component
interface. With respect to dependability, wrappers are
used for ensuring security, transparent component
replication, etc.
Our focus is on developing protective wrappers -
protectors - that can improve the overall system
dependability by protecting both the system against
erroneous behaviour of an OTS item and the OTS item
against erroneous requests from the system [11]. This
development can be a complex process that requires
rigour and discipline and should be integrated into the
process of the development of the whole system.
Recent research in the area has addressed some
important issues but in our opinion there is a need for
systematic general solutions. Paper [10] shows how to
build wrappers using results of the testing of the OTS
item and of fault injection (at its interface). This allows
the wrapper to intercept certain inputs and outputs and
make their intended recipients ignore them. Paper [6]
discusses how OTS items can be used in safety critical
systems and proposes to protect the critical services from
them by completely isolating these items from the rest of
the system using encapsulation mechanisms (this
approach cannot be applied in those systems in which
OTS items are involved in delivering all types of
services). A very interesting approach to developing
protective wrappers for an OTS microkernel is discussed
in [9]. The idea is to specify the correct behaviour of a
microkernel and to make the protective wrapper check
calls the microkernel (note that this approach cannot be
applied for OTS items that lack a complete, correct
specification). In addition, the results of fault injection are
used, in that the wrapper is designed to catch those calls
that have been found to cause errors of the particular
microkernel implementation to be wrapped. A similar
approach is suggested [3] for using the Ballista projectÕs
results from fault injection on different vendorsÕ POSIX
implementations. We do agree that known bug reports
should be used in developing wrappers, because it is often
unlikely that the vendors of the OTS item will correct it
on request. This cannot solve all problems, however:
blocking calls which would trigger known faults (bugs)
neither tolerates the fault, nor protects against
undiscovered faults. Moreover, the proposed solutions do
not take into account many important considerations. A
typical assumption is that wrappers themselves are
ÒsimpleÓ (at least in relation to the wrapped components)
and that their development is a trivial task. This is not
always the case: indeed, a wrapper is a piece of software
like any other and just as prone to defects as any other
software engineering artefact of comparable complexity.
Wrappers will often be complex artefacts and requiring
them to perform protection functions will make them
more complex. Moreover, common failures of protectors
and the protected item should be taken into account when
developing the wrapper and assessing the overall system
dependability. We believe that protective wrappers should
be used as a general error detection feature and as a
systematic means for attempting to deal with errors as
early as possible. To avoid uncontrolled complexity,
wrapper development needs a systematic, disciplined
approach.
The simplest system model of OTS use consists of:
the OTS item to be integrated, the computer system in
which it is to be incorporated (we call it the Rest Of the
System - ROS, so that the computer system will consist of
the OTS item and the ROS), and the environment
controlled by the computer system. We assume that the
OTS item can be accessed via its declared interface only,
and the system designers may have no information at all
about the internal structure or behaviour of such items (in
practice, there is a continuum of cases from "pure black
box" situations to "clear box" ones, like open source OTS
items. Even the latter pose some of the problems we have
to deal with when dealing with black boxes.)
3 Design of Protector
3.1 Acceptable Behaviour Constraints
There are many reasons why improved protection (i.e.
error detection and recovery) is important for system
integration [11, 10, 12]: the OTS itemÕs specification can
be incomplete; components might not work as promised
by their providers or might have bugs; unspecified (non-
standard) features of the component might be used by the
ROS (this can, for example, affect compatibility with
future versions of the OTS item); the environment
(controlled system) may suffer failures that cause non-
obvious requests on the OTS item; the ROS might misuse
the component or the component can output incorrect
commands to the controlled environment. In addition,
depending on the application context, developers might
decide not to use some part of the component service, or
they might know specific restrictions on input/output
parameters. In these cases it may be important to check
that these restrictions are satisfied.
To design wrappers/protectors, system developers (i.e.
integrators) should "develop" their view on what the OTS
component and the ROS do and do not do with respect to
each other. We call this the Acceptable Behaviour
Constraints (ABCs) from the viewpoint of the system
developers. In particular, the ABCs may specify the
boundaries of situations that can cause violations of the
environmentÕs safety, and situations that are ÒsuspiciousÓ
— those for which the system designer has insufficient
evidence for believing that the system is behaving
correctly and is in a state in which it is likely to continue
behaving correctly. The ABCs should be developed
formally and systematically and the protector
implemented to enforce (or at least check) their
satisfaction. Developing these constraints should be an
important part of the process of integrating OTS items: it
may be supported by assembling requirements from
several viewpoints (from the perspective of the ROS and
that of the OTS item) and using traceability arguments to
assess the consistency of these viewpoints. Section 4
provides an overview of this assessment.
Having declared the ABCs, the designer takes the
usual precautions to tolerate detected errors (or
ÒsuspiciousÓ situations — which might develop into errors)
or at least to mitigate their effects. The conventional
mechanisms for error detection, containment and recovery
and/or failure compensation [4] are employed.
Our approach relies on existing research on executable
assertions [8] and on design by contract [5]. There are
some obstacles to be considered in the way of applying
these ideas to developing protectors, mainly because OTS
items may be black boxes and integrators do not generally
have their complete, correct specification. Only some
types of assertions [8] are applicable in our context: e.g.,
Òconsistency between argumentsÓ, Òdependency of return
value on argumentsÓ, Òframe specificationsÓ. However,
the examples given in [8] and most other papers on
assertions refer to low-level information, in a
"programming in the small" context, and we think that
more complex, application-specific and whole-system-
specific assertions should be included in the ABCs of a
component. Design by contract has a different purpose: in
our context the system designer develops a protector
using his/her view on a "correct" contract between the
ROS and the OTS item, and on their correct behaviour
with respect to each other, rather than using a contract
explicitly accepted by the OTS itemÕs designer.
The various possible ingredients listed in ABCs are
alternative, partial descriptions of overlapping views, not
subsets in a universe described in one consistent
language. General sources of information that can be used
are:
• behaviour specification of OTS items as specified by
their designers;
•  behaviour specification of an OTS item as specified
by system designers. This description and the
previous one must satisfy certain mutual constraints
for the system design to be correct, but they will not
be identical. E.g. the system designer’s description
requires the OTS item to be able to react to a set of
stimuli that is a subset of the set specified by the
component designer;
•  behaviour that the system designer expects from an
OTS item (not necessarily approving it): i.e., he/she
may know that that it often fails in response to certain
legal stimuli;
•  component (OTS or part of ROS) behaviour that
system designers considers especially unacceptable,
without knowing whether it is likely or not;
• behaviour specifications of the ROS.
The specification of the protector, and especially the
knowledge and assumptions on which it is based, should
be captured in an analysable (traceable) way, in the same
way as it is with the OTS item to be protected. This
makes it possible to reuse the protector with a new
version of the OTS item (or improve the protector when
the integrator’s understanding of the system improves)
and check that the assumptions made are still valid.
The functionalities of protectors that ABCs have to
inform are summarised in the table of cues (Table 1) that
a protector can be designed to use to determine that some
action is in order. The cues are found in the
communication ("messages" in the table) between the
OTS and ROS components. These categories are not
meant to be mutually exclusive, nor exhaustive;
separating them this way is useful for use as a checklist
for system designers, and because they differ in the
complexity of detecting them, how strong an indication
they are of something being wrong, etc.
Table 1
Category of cue of what possible unpleasant events
error
of
ROS
error
of
OTS
item
threat
for
ROS
threat
for
OTS
item
detection can
be
programmed
using
knowledge
about
input to OTS item:
the message is outside the domain (within the OTS item input
space, seen as space of possible histories of inputs) with which
system designers intended the OTS item to deal (may indicate
error by the ROS, or simply a behaviour foreseen by system
designers but intended to be considered as an exception)
Y Y system design
the message is outside the domain for which the OTS item has
been judged "good enough to be trusted"
Y Y Y OTS item
the message is within a domain with which the OTS item is
known to have trouble coping
Y Y Y OTS item
the message is an illegal 'input' for the OTS item (incompatible
with the item specs as understood by system designer,
irrespective of previous history of interactions)
Y Y Y OTS item
the message is erroneous (incompatible - in view of the previous
history of interactions - with ROS specs as understood by
system designer) for the ROS to issue
Y Y Y ROS/system
the message is an illegal output for the ROS Y Y ROS
output from OTS item:
illegal output for the OTS item Y Y OTS item
erroneous output for the OTS item Y Y OTS item
risky for the controlled environment in view of its known safety
envelope
Y ROS
indicative of the OTS item having used functions/parts (of the
item itself) that we do not trust (either we lack positive evidence
of their being good enough, or we have positive evidence that
they are not)
Y Y OTS item
risky for computer system internally Y Y Y part of
computer
system that is
threatened
In addition, designers have to specify what recovery
actions the protector should perform if the component
violates its ABCs. These actions can be directed in either
or both directions: to the OTS item and/or to the ROS.
Possible reactions are (the list is not exhaustive, nor are
these reactions mutually exclusive):
•  report exception/error code to the issuer of the
message or to a global executive or diagnostic
subsystem or a human operator;
• substitute the message with a "safe" one;
• redirect the message to an alternative destination (e.g.
a ÒtrustedÓ, though less sophisticated fall-back
implementation of the OTS itemÕs functions);
• perform a simpler version of the OTS itemÕs function
(as above), provided by the protector itself;
•  let the message through, but schedule extra checks
for the subsequent behaviour of the recipient;
• re-try the previous interactions that led to the current
message;
• undo (compensation) but only using the standard
OTS item interface;
•  perform damage assessment (using the standard
interfaces only);
•  put OTS item and/or ROS into a consistent known
state (experience shows that OTS items are very
often left in unknown inconsistent states when they
signal errors [3, 9]);
• switch OTS item off end repair it off-line;
• replace failed OTS item with a new one.
Note that with any of the above, the designer may
want to:
•  initiate state restoration activities for the suspected
erroneous party, e.g. preparing to reset/restart it, or
running an audit program on its internal state;
•  log the event in a log which is used in interpreting
severity of future cues (essentially, reconfiguring the
cue detecting functions).
Some of these actions imply additional design
precautions; e.g., several require precautions to preserve
consistency between the computation histories seen by the
OTS item and the ROS; retry of an action may mean re-
sending to the originator of the suspect message the last
message that caused it to send the suspect message. Some
of these reactions may require complex implementations
and designers may decide to exclude them a priori to
avoid the risk of getting them wrong.
3.2  Example
To demonstrate our approach let us consider a simple
example. The application considered is illustrated in Fig.
1. The Òcontrolled environmentÓ is a boiler, with sensors
(pressure, P, and temperature, T) and actuators
(controlling a heating burner which can be ON/OFF, and
inlet/outlet valves) for controlling it. Smart sensors and
actuators are used with IEEE 488 interfaces. The OTS
item (ÒOTSÓ for brevity) is a PID controller, a card which
also implements the IEEE 488 interface. The protector is
placed between the smart sensors/actuators and the PID
controller. The protector’s implementation can be either
partially in hardware (something that breaks the physical
connections and therefore can insert altered messages) or
purely in software (if allowed by either the rest of the
control system - ROS - or OTS item). The protocols
required by the sensors/actuators (e.g., the precision used
to encode the input/output signal, message formats, etc.)
are completely known to the system integrator, and so is
the environment. This simple example is representative of
some real design situations, and at the same time useful
for illustrating our general ideas.
Fig. 1. An example of integrating an OTS item into a system
 Table 2
Types of cues Examples
Output from ROS is illegal per the system
designer’s specification of system operation
P and T are outside the envelope of values anticipated by system designer
Input to OTS for which OTS is not fully trusted Measured derivative of T or P is beyond a certain value which is the
maximum value for which the OTS has been tested
Input to OTS for which OTS is known to be
untrustworthy
T (or) P (or their derivatives) close to boundaries specified for the PID
controller, but for which system designer knows (from communication
within user groups) that PID has trouble in some cases.
Illegal output from ROS (according to ROS’s own
specification)
Syntax error in messages exchanged over the IEEE 488 bus
Detectably erroneous output from OTS ‘OFF to the burner when the T is low and falling’
Output from ROS is detectably erroneous ROS sampling rate suddenly increases past specified rate
Output from OTS that is likely to violate
implementation constraints in ROS
The PID controller changes its pace of processing and starts sending too
frequent messages to ROS
ROS
Boiler
(Controlled Environment)
           Temperature (T)
          Pressure (P)
sensors
actuators
OTS item
(a PID
controller)
Control System (Computer System)
Wrapper
(protector)
Table 2 lists examples of cues for a wrapper/protector
to detect, categorised as in Table 1. In every case shown
in Table 2 the protector can take some combination of
these actions:
•  shut down the boiler to a safe state by sending
appropriate commands to the actuators;
•  reset the ROS, OTS or both to clear a supposed
transient problem;
• take note of a problem but not take any action unless
the problem appears to persist.
4 Traceability for Protectors
The properties of an OTS item are usually
incompletely described; information may be obtained
from its interface specification or other associated sources
where available. To develop a protector, we need to look
at the available information from different viewpoints,
each of which can be expressed in terms of relations RF
(requires from) and PT (provides to) [2]:
•  What does the ROS require from the OTS item —
RF(ros,ots) ?
•  What does the OTS item require from the ROS —
RF(ots,ros)?
•  What does the ROS provide to the OTS item —
PT(ros,ots)?
•  What does the OTS item provide to the ROS —
PT(ots,ros)?
In each case ÒWhat doesÓ refers both to functional
properties and non-functional properties such as
timeliness and accuracy. The latter are particularly
important for OTS items [1] as it is typically the non-
functional requirements that differ between (apparently)
functionally equivalent OTS items: they can thus be used
both to discriminate between OTS candidates and as a cue
for developing a protector. Looking at the interactions
between these relations we can identify three possibilities:
•  RF(ros,ots) = PT(ots,ros) and RF(ots,ros) =
PT(ros,ots). This the ideal case where the OTS item
is a Òperfect fitÓ for the ROS. This case is unlikely,
indeed it is likely that availability of information will
limit our knowledge of how close we are to this ideal
case.
•  RF(ros,ots) É  PT(ots,ros). This characterises the
situation where there are some properties required by
ros  which ots does not provide (similarly with
RF(ots,ros) É  PT(ros,ots)): in this case the OTS item
is simply not suitable to be integrated with the ROS.
•  PT(ots,ros) ˝  RF(r o s , o t s )  and PT(ros,ots) ˝
RF(ots,ros). In this case it is the differences between
the relations which should be investigated, to identify
possible sources of threat which the protector should
address.
While we may not be fortunate enough even to have a
specification of the ROS, we should be able to fill in the
information in viewpoints (1) and (3) above. For (2) and
(4) a vendor-supplied product-description will provide
some information but this may not be of a trusted quality.
In this case the information should be supplemented with
external sources such as bug reports, field reports and
testing by the system designer. In this context we can
view a ÒbugÓ as one kind of Òunrequired functionalityÓ,
i.e. a member of PT(ots,ros) — RF(ros,ots).
For each of the properties identified in the viewpoints,
a series of supplementary questions can then be
systematically asked in order to assess where there would
be a threat to either the ROS or the OTS, in a manner
similar to a HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) study.
Sample questions are:
•  What is the effect of this property not being
provided?
•  What evidence is there that this property can be
provided correctly?
• Is this evidence reliable/relevant in this situation?
•  For properties provided which are not required, can
we predict the effect to ROS or to OTS item?
In each case where threats arise, it should be recorded
what protection is implemented (using actions from
Section 3), and a level of confidence that the protection is
adequate for the threats that have been identified.
5 Implementation Issues
A popular way of developing, disseminating and using
OTS items is to employ existing component technologies
such as, CORBA, DCOM+ and Enterprise Java Beans
(EJB). This general approach works well for application-
level items (it is worth mentioning that it cannot be
applied to software at the levels below the application,
e.g. CORBA services, OS, communication protocols,
etc.). Such technologies usually offer standard ways of
intercepting component calls, and these can be used for
implementing protectors. These features are called
"interceptors" in CORBA and DCOM+, and "proxies" in
CORBA3 and EJB. The CORBA2 specification allows
for interceptor services. These are services that can be
inserted into the normal invocation path for CORBA
objects. The interceptor service is registered with the
ORB which then ensures that any request sent by a client
to an object is passed through the interceptor service, and
on return the result also passes through the interceptor
service. DCOM+ interceptors are generated automatically
by component containers and intercept cross-process
calls. EJB and CORBA3 generate proxies that stand in
place of the target component and allow interception of
method invocations sent to the component. The degree to
which these interception services and proxies are open
varies. For example, ORBIX has a feature called filtering
that is in effect a CORBA interception service.
Although some of these features are either not
completely open, as they are used to support particular
services, or not flexible enough to allow simple
implementation (or tailoring to specific applications, or
replacement) of the application-specific protective
functions, they can serve as a sound basis for
implementing protectors. More experimental work will
have to be done in this area to develop better ways of
wrapping and to support them with a clear guide to typical
patterns for implementing protectors, with libraries
supporting efficient implementations of protectors and
their typical functionalities. This will assist in systematic
incorporation of protector development into the whole
system integration process.
6 Conclusions
We have proposed a systematic approach to
developing protective wrappers which work at the
application level to improve the dependability of systems
built by integrating OTS software. We treat wrapper
development as a specific engineering process including
several steps during system integration. Wrapper
development starts with specifying Acceptable Behaviour
Constraints (ABCs) and thus possible violation of the
acceptable behaviour of both the OTS item and of the
ROS. We discuss initial checklists of possible symptoms
of undesired events which the wrappers should try to
detect, and defensive actions to be taken. The OTS items
may be completely ÓblackÓ boxes and the information
provided by their suppliers is restricted and not reliable.
Traceability analysis is used to organise the information
for developing and maintaining protective wrappers.
Existing component technologies seem to provide
sufficient features for implementing the protective
wrappers without resorting to non-standard techniques.
The reviewers of this paper helpfully raised the issue
of whether this approach would scale well when applied
to multiple OTS items in complex systems. This issue
really concerns three different effects of multiplying the
number of OTS components and of protective wrappers:
•  resources: with more OTS items, there will be more
places for run-time checks by wrappers and thus
more overhead. This is true, but the systematic design
approach we advocate allows designers explicitly to
state trade-offs between robustness and performance
goals. For instance, they can decide the granularity of
protective wrapping, e.g. wrapping a set of OTS
components together as a single subsystem;
•  reliability vs "safety". With the conservative
approach we have outlined, of checking for all kinds
of symptoms of possible trouble, designers may be
drawn to interrupt normal processing too frequently
for error recovery. Again, what we advocate is
explicit consideration of the resulting tradeoffs.
Without protective wrapping, the default decision is
to continue operation no matter what the risk that
failures will soon follow, and thus forsaking chances
of affordable preventive action;
•  unintended side effects and interactions. A mix of
protective actions of multiple wrappers and badly
understood behaviours of the OTS items looks like a
likely source of unintended interactions with possibly
serious consequences. A systematic approach to
design does not fully protect against them. Designers
also need to rely on testing to detect them and on
system-level error confinement and recovery
provisions for protection against rare but high-
consequence failures. Such risks exist in all complex
designs with poorly understood components.
In general, we expect a systematic approach for
including protection during system integration to help
developers in dealing with system complexity,
encapsulating errors and developing structured
approaches to handling them. The complexity of the
protective wrappers themselves should not be an issue as
they should be developed systematically (and re-used
when possible). Protective wrappers can serve as a solid
defence against new problems introduced when upgrading
either the OTS items or the rest of the system. Last, our
approach promotes the evolution of wrappers as new
information is learned about the OTS items’ behaviour.
Our future research will concentrate on:
•  probabilistic modelling (assessing the protectorÕs
error coverage, probability of producing correct
action by the wrapped item, and error correlation
between the OTS items and the protectors);
•  employing diversity with OTS components:
investigating architectures with (for example) several
diverse items and adjudication of results, and
proposing means of pursuing diversity between
failure modes of components, wrappers and
adjudicators.
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